Japan’s Incorporation of Takeshima into Its Territory in 1905*

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I. Introduction

Territorial issues have been the cause of many international disputes not only in ancient times but also today. Moreover, as shown in the dispute over the Falklands some years ago, a territorial dispute intrinsically tends to numb rational reasoning and leads to an outburst of anti-foreign nationalism.

At present, Japan continues to be involved in territorial disputes over the three islands of the Kuriles (Chishima retto), Senkaku shoto, and Takeshima; none of which is likely to be settled any time in the near future. One practical way to resolve a territorial dispute is to resort to international law. However, if the international law is to be applied in a manner acceptable by the countries concerned, there must first be a common basis on which

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to perceive the facts *per se* concerning the dispute.

Therefore, I think it is important to provide some forward-looking suggestions by inquiring in a concrete and objective manner into the history of a disputed area in order to aid in the settlement of Japan’s territorial question that has come to a deadlock due to the conflicting national interests of the two sides and their national sentiments.

The ownership of Takeshima (Koreans call it Tokdo)\(^1\) has been a bone of contention between Japan and the Republic of Korea and between Japan and North Korea. This postwar dispute at the international level surfaced immediately after the establishment of the so-called Syngman Rhee Line in 1952, around the conclusion of the Republic of Korea-Japan Basic Agreement in 1965 again and also in 1977 when the establishment of 200-nautical-mile territorial waters became an issue. Not a small number of documents regarding Takeshima were made public at these times.\(^2\)

As methodology in writing this article, a critical examination is made of *Takeshima no rekishi chirigakuteki kenkyu* (Historical and Geographical Study of Takeshima) (Tokyo: Kinkoshoten, 1966) by Kawakami Kenzo. This article develops an argument as opposed to Kawakami’s claims. Kawakami’s study is chosen because:

(1) It is the most extensive study made in Japan on the history of Takeshima; (2) its author was a researcher at the Japanese Foreign Ministry at the time of its writing and the study was made at the request of the government; and (3) it is used by Japan today as the

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1. Takeshima and Ullingdo have been called by many different names in Korea and Japan. In order to avoid confusion, the names used today are given in addition to the old ones. The island consists of tiny, rocky uninhabitable islets of about 56 acres with no trees and potable water.

most cogent basis in claiming its sovereign right to Takeshima.\(^3\)

This study is intended to shed light on Japan’s relations with Takeshima since the Meiji Restoration in 1867 and on what grounds Japan managed to place Takeshima into its territory in 1905. To help understand the situation more clearly, a brief overview is also made of the events before that period. No discussion will be made on international laws. Kawakami repeatedly asserts that in his study he attempted to inquire into the history of Takeshima from a purely academic perspective without being affected by the actual territorial dispute on the islets. Is his assertion true?

II. Knowledge and Consciousness of Takeshima as a Territory

A. The Government of the Chosŏn Dynasty, Korea from 1392 to 1910 and the Edo Government of Japan from 1615 to 1867

The reference to Takeshima/Tokdo was first made in Korean documents approximately 200 years before it was first made in Japanese documents. Sejong sillok chiriji, or the gazetteer in the Annals of King Sejong (actually compiled in 1432 and formally published in 1454), refers to Takeshima/Tokdo in the entry on Uljinhynŏn, Kangwŏndo as follows: “There exist two islands, Usan and Mullŭng, in the sea off the east coast of this county. The islands are not far away from each other, so one can be seen from the other on a clear day.”

In other words, separate from Ullŭngdo that was known to

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3. In his paper entitled “Takeshima/Tokdo mondai to nihon kokka ‘The Issue of Takeshima/Tokdo and Japan’ Chosen Kenkyu (Study on Korea), No. 182, 1978, Professor Kajimura Hideki criticizes Kawakami’s study mainly from a logical point of view.
Koreans as early as the Silla Dynasty, there exists another island, and Ullŭngdo and this island are visible from each other on a clear day. In Korea, Usando has been known as Takeshima/Tokdo.

However, Kawakami maintains that Usando does not exist and that it does not make sense to say that Usando is Takeshima/Tokdo today.4 He cites the following two historical records:

First, the section on Uljinhŭn in the chiriji (Gazetteer) in Koryŏsa (History of Korea, 1451) which reads “Ullŭngdo is situated in the midst of the East Sea and was called Usan’guk during the Silla Dynasty. It is also known as Mullŭng or Ullŭng… According to one theory, Usan and Mullŭng were originally two separate islands; they were not far apart, and were visible from each other on a clear day.”

Second, in the entry on Uljinhŭn, Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam (Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea, 1531), notes as follows: “There are two islands, Usando and Ullŭngdo which is also called Mullŭng or Ullŭng, are in the midst of the East Sea… One theory has it that Usando and Ullŭngdo are one and the same island.”

As noted above, Koryŏsa describes Usan and Mullŭng as two different names of the same island, whereas Sinjung tongguk yŏji sŭngnam (Revised and Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea) treats Usan and Mullŭng as two different islands. Kawakami believes the one-and-same-island theory for Usan and Mullŭng is more convincing. He holds that the treatment of Usan and Mullŭng as two different islands as seen in other historical records was the result of overstretching the meaning of an erroneous note given in Koryŏsa.

The primary basis on which Kawakami places his assertion is the point of time in which the two historical records, Sejong sillok (Annals of King Sejong) and Koryŏsa were compiled. Kawakami

4. Kawakami op. cit., pp. 94-120.
admits that as a whole Sejong sillok is the older data than Koryŏsa. However, when it comes to the description of Ullŭngdo, Sejong sillok notes an incident concerning the island that took place during the reign of King Sejong, an incident that is not mentioned in Koryŏsa. For that reason, Kawakami says that as far as the issue of Takeshima/Tokdo is concerned, Koryŏsa represents an older basic record than Sejong sillok. The fact, however, is that it is only natural that Koryŏsa should not treat the Chosŏn period that follows the Koryŏ period it covers.

As the second basis for his assertion, Kawakami states that since Takeshima/Tokdo cannot be seen from Ullŭngdo what is described as Usando in Sejong sillok cannot be Takeshima/Tokdo. He also argues that the part of Koryŏsa which says that “on a clear day they can be seen from each other” does not involve two separate islands, but rather it refers to Ullŭngdo and the mainland of the Korean Peninsula. In making this assertion, however, Kawakami apparently disregards the context and misreads the subject in the above-cited portion of Koryŏsa. Furthermore, that Takeshima/Tokdo can be seen from Ullŭngdo has been already proved. Even Japanese documents state that “on a clear day one can see Takeshima/Tokdo from a high spot on the mountain of Ullŭngdo” and that “Takeshima/Tokdo, 50 ri (one ri is about 2.44 miles, 3,937 meters) away from Ullŭngdo can be seen from Ullŭngdo on a day when the sea is calm.” These remarks concur not only with what is said in Sejong sillok, but even with the configuration sketched by a

5. Physically, at an altitude of 120 meters or more on Ullŭngdo, one can see Takeshima/Tokdo. Lee Han-ki, Han’guk ŭl yŏngt’o (Korea’s Territories) (Seoul: Seoul National University (SNU) Press, 1969), pp. 232-4. The altitude of the highest peak of the mountain on Ullŭngdo is 985 meters. Kawakami, however, says (page 281) that it is very difficult to climb to this height at Ullŭngdo because the island is thickly covered by shrubs and trees.


Japanese warship in Chart 3 (See page 512).

Although the description in the text of Koryōsa is somewhat confusing, it is clear that in the early 15th century, Koreans already knew that apart from Ullūngdo there existed in its vicinity a separate island. And the fact that these islands are recorded in the official gazetteer is considered to indicate Korea’s consciousness of them as its possessions.

The more serious defect in Kawakami’s book is that because of his assumption that this Usando does not exist, he has to deny the existence of every Usando that appears in many documents and maps of the 16th century and thereafter.⁸ Vol. 30 of Sukchong sil-lok (Annals of King Sukchong, 1728), for example, reads in part that An Yong-bok, who visited Japan a couple of times for talks with Japanese authorities over disputes involving Ullūngdo toward the end of the 17th century, is quoted as stating “Songdo, also called Chasando, is our territory,” and “By the islands of Ullūngdo and Chasando, the boundary of Chosŏn is set.”

Kawakami, although he admits that An Yong-bok knew of the existence of Takeshima/Tokdo, refuses to accept An’s testimony as anything of historical value, saying that the testimony is fictitious in many parts. However, even putting aside the authenticity of An’s testimony, the simple fact that he called Takeshima/Tokdo Usando and stated that the island and Ullūngdo were Chosŏn’s territory is enough to confute Kawakami’s assertion that Usando does

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8. Originally, Usan and Ullūng were the different transcriptions of the same word in Chinese characters, but they had come to be established as the names of two different islands. For Usan (千山) different or erroneous characters are used: 千山, 千山, 子山, 千山, 豸山, 千山 etc. Some Japanese scholars say that Usando is Takesho (Bousole Rock), an island one nautical mile east of Ullūngdo. However, their view cannot substantiate the description that “on a clear day, it can be seen.” Their assertion also does not agree with a report made by E. Laporte, a Frenchman working for the Pusan Customs Office after surveying Ullūngdo in June 1899. It cited Usando and Takeshima as being two big islands appendant to Ullūngdo. See the Hwangsan sinmun, Sept. 23, 1899.
not exist.

The *Yŏjigo* (Gazetteer) in *Chungbo munhŏn pigo* (Augmented Reference Compilation of Documents on Korea), published in 1908, points out that “what is cited in the *yojji* as Ullŭng and Usan belong to Usan’guk, and Usan is what Japanese call “Matsushima,” thus accurately stating that Usando is Takeshima/Tokdo today. In view of the fact that *Chungbo munhŏn pigo* is the result of the 200-year long Korean government project to compile its annals continuously, it is obvious that the Chosŏn government had long been conscious of Usando as part of its territory.

There are many other Korean and Japanese references that show Takeshima/Tokdo as Usando. For instance, *Taehan singi* (A New Treatise on Korean Geography, 1907), by Chang Chi-yŏn states that there is Usando southeast of Ullŭngdo. Also in *Chosen koku chirishiti kiyo* (A Summary of Korean Geography, 1876), by Kondo Horoku, and *Shinsen cho senchiri shi* (A New Geography of Korea, 1894) by Ota Saijirō it is noted that Usando exists separate from Ullŭngdo in the East Sea.

Chart 1

![Map of Takeshima and Usando](image)

Ministry of Education, the Empire of Korea, ed., *Taehan yŏchido* (Korean Gazetteer, 1899), Seoul: The Kyujang-gak library, Seoul National Univ.
The Korean map that first showed Usando separate from Ullųngdo is a map included in *Tongguk yŏjī sŭngnam*, 1499. Since then, it is said, Usando has appeared in several hundred other Korean maps that have been made thus far. These old maps may not be accurate about the location and size of Ullųngdo and Usando. Nonetheless, the single fact that so many old maps show Ullųngdo and Usando suggests that the existence of Usando had been widely known among Koreans.

Especially by the end of the 19th century, Korea had come to have more accurate knowledge about Usando as the Korean government began to develop Ullųngdo. Korea's knowledge of Takeshima/Tokdo of this time is well illustrated by *Taehan yŏjido* (Korean Gazetteer) edited by the Ministry of Education, the Empire of Korea, in 1899 and is kept in the Kyujang-gak Library, Seoul National University (See Chart 1). For an old map, Ullųngdo and Takeshima/Tokdo are shown in almost accurate positions on the map. Given all these facts, it is clear that Kawakami's assertion that no Usando exists cannot be upheld. In other words, as early as the 15th century, the Korean government regarded Takeshima/Tokdo, then called Usando, as its territory, and in the late 19th century its consciousness of ownership again became pronounced although there had been some period of confusion.

The Japanese document that mentions Takeshima/Tokdo for the first time ever is a book *Onshu shicho goki* (Records on Observations in Oki Province) by Saito Hosen, a retainer of Izumo in 1667. By the name of Matsushima, it is shown along with Takeshima/Ullųngdo. Since then the configurations of these islands have become known in detail among Japanese as they found their way to Ullųngdo.

Beginning in the mid-15th century, the Korean government

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evacuated people from Ullųngdo as it enforced a vacant island policy. In 1617, the merchant ship of Otani Jinkichi of Yonago, was wrecked and drifted to Ullųngdo. Drawn to the rich products of island, he, together with Murakawa Ichibei, applied to the Japanese government for a license to navigate to the island. Receiving permits from the Japanese authorities in the following year, 1618, the families of Otani and Murakawa alternately dispatched ships to Ullųngdo for lumbering and gathering products.

The two Japanese families falsely claimed the “enfeoffment of Takeshima,” but what the Shogunate gave them were “permits for passage” to the island. It appears that the Japanese families engaged in fishing for some time off Matsushima/Tokdo on their way to Takeshima/Ullųngdo. In 1661, they received from the Japanese government a new permit for passage to Matsushima/Tokdo. However, the Japanese families’ main destination, or main area of activity, was Takeshima/Ullųngdo, and Matsushima/Tokdo was only incidental to this operation.

Apparently because of the different sizes of Takeshima/Ullųngdo and Matsushima/Tokdo, historical records written at that time variously describe Matsushima/Tokdo as “being situated within Takeshima,”11 or “being located near Takeshima”12 or “being an islet close to Takeshima.”13 Thus they treat Matsushima as an adjunct to Takeshima. During the period when Japanese were repeatedly navigating to Ullųngdo, Japan apparently was unaware of the fact that the island was Korea’s territory.

In 1693, there occurred at Ullųngdo a major clash between a group of Japanese from the Otani family and An Yong-bok and other Korean fishermen who were on a fishing venture from Kyŏngsangdo. As the Otanis and Murakawas brought the matter

10. One reason was that the island was often ransacked by Japanese pirates and another was that people sought to live in the island to evade taxation.
12. Ibid., p. 80.
before the Shogunate, this developed into the so-called "Takeshima Incident" pitting Japan against Korea through diplomatic channel over the fishing rights and ownership of the island. In the process of diplomatic negotiation, the lord of Tsushima, Japan, plotted a scheme to take Ullŭngdo away from Korea, plunging the Korean authorities into confusion for a time as they sought to counter the Japanese scheme.

However, after An Yong-bok went to Japan again to assert that Ullŭngdo and Usando were Korean territory, the hard-liners against Japan became dominant within the Korean government. Because it was historically evident that Ullŭngdo belonged to Korea since the Silla period, the Japanese government eventually restrained Tsushima's lord from making any reckless attempt against Korea and adopted a cooperative policy toward Korea. More specifically, in January 1696, the Japanese authorities prohibited the Otani and Murakami families from going to Takeshima/Ullŭngdo any more. In January 1699, "the Takeshima Incident" was settled as the Japanese authorities formally recognized in an official document\(^\text{14}\) that Ullŭngdo belonged to Korea.

The Japanese document does not specifically mention the name of Matsushima/Tokdo, but regards the island as an appendant of Takeshima/Ullŭngdo, and thus its ownership is considered to have been treated likewise. Japanese fishing activity at Matsushima/Tokdo in the 17th century was only incidental to their advance to Takeshima/Ullŭngdo. Therefore, with the Japanese government decision to prohibit Japanese fishermen from going over to Takeshima/Ullŭngdo, their passage to Matsushima/Tokdo had to come to an end, too. As a matter of fact, none from the Otanis and Murakawas sailed to Matsushima/Tokdo as their sole destination

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13. Ibid., p. 78.
thereafter.

Still, it appears that some other Japanese fishermen from the San’ın area secretly crossed to Ulleungdo. Some private Japanese books describe Matsushima/Tokdo as belonging to Okinokuni, Japan. There is also another Japanese book that does not seem to know even that Takeshima/Ulleungdo is Korea’s island. However, these irresponsible civilians’ knowledge and information have no bearing at all on the question of territorial sovereignty.

Among Japanese data that indicate Japan’s consciousness of its sovereign territory are maps made by the Japanese government. Of these maps, the one which shows Matsushima/Tokdo for the first time is Nihon yochirotei jenzu, a map drawn by Nagakubo Sekisui in 1773. It is the first Japanese map that used latitude and longitude. Nagakubo also published Nippon rotei yochizu, another map printed in color from wood blocks in 1778. What makes this map particularly notable is that while the Japanese mainland and its attached islands are shown in color, Takeshima/Ulleungdo and Matsushima/Usando, along with the Korean Peninsula, are not colored. Thus, after the Takeshima incident, the official maps do not treat Takeshima/Ulleungdo and Matsushima/Tokdo as Japan’s possessions.

A more recent official Japanese map, Tainippon enkai yochi zenzu, a map of Japan’s coastal waters by Ino Tadataka in 1821, considered to mark a complete break from the older maps, also shows Takeshima/Ulleungdo and Matsushima/Tokdo as not being Japan’s territory. Japan’s attitude toward Matsushima/Tokdo, was somewhat ambiguous around the mid-17th century, but it became

16. Hokugen Tsuan, ed., Takeshima zuseisu (Illustrated Record of Takeshima), published during the Horai nenkan (1751-64).
17. Matsuura Takeshiro, Takeshima zasshi (An Encyclopedia of Takeshima), 1854.
18. Ch’oe Suh Myun, op. cit.
fairly clear after the governmental negotiations between Korea and Japan. In the Genroku era, in other words, in the late 17th century and thereafter, Japan did not treat Matsushima/Tokdo as part of its territory, though it became aware of the existence of the island.

As we have seen so far, it was by advancing to Korea’s island, Ullüngdo, that Japanese came to know much about Matsushima/Tokdo. When the governments of Korea and Japan settled the Korea’s ownership of Ullüngdo, Matsushima/Tokdo; as its appendant island, quite naturally was excluded from the domain of Japan.

B. Cognizance of Takeshima/Tokdo by the Meiji Government (1868-1912)

Japan, as it came into contact with European countries and the United States from the early Meiji era, found its cognizance of Ullüngdo and Takeshima/Tokdo, thrown into great confusion. To begin with, French and British vessels that came into the Sea of Japan (East Sea) toward the end of the 18th century discovered Ullüngdo one after another. However, due to their inaccurate measurement of the geographical location of Ullüngdo, they introduced Ullüngdo as two separate islands of Dagelet and Argonaut. Later in 1849 Takeshima/Tokdo was found by a French vessel that named it Liancourt Rocks. Hence the maps in Europe in the mid-19th century showed Ullüngdo as two separate islands in the Sea of Japan (East Sea) or showed Ullüngdo as consisting of two such islands plus another island of Takeshima/Tokdo. This European information and Japan’s knowledge of Takeshima and Matsushima from times past combined to cause confusion as to the way Japan viewed these two island. These developments have already been clearly known by a number of studies.

On Chosen jenzu, a map of Korea made by the Army Staff Bureau in 1875 and Nihon jenzu, a map of Japan by Japan’s Min-
istry of Education in 1877, Ullüngdo is shown as two separate islands, Takeshima and Matsushima and the present Takeshima/Tokdo is omitted. Soon the existence of Argonaut was negated and turning away from the Edo period representation, Ullüngdo was now called Matsushima, and there appeared only one island in the Sea of Japan (East Sea) on maps.

Another civilian map showed three islands. Thus, from the '70s to the early '80s. Japan’s knowledge of the two islands became considerably confused. With a three-island view, a two-island view, or one-island view, few accurately grasping the locations of the two islands. This is counter evidence refuting a view that Takeshima/Tokdo was an inherent part of Japanese territory in ancient times.

In the process of overcoming such confusion and putting things in order, the Japanese government began to settle the question of title to these islands. As no unified action was taken among the agencies, let us examine the separate actions one by one. The Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs was the first to take action on the ownership of these two islands. In October 1876, the Office of Geography, the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs, sent an inquiry to Shimane prefecture for information about Takeshima/Tokdo in the course of the compilation of a cadastre.¹⁹

Shimane prefecture examined the particulars of the development of Takeshima/Ullüngdo by the Otani and Murakawa families, and sent a reply entitled Nihonkainai takeshima hoka itto chiseki hensan kata ukagai (An Inquiry about the Compilation of the Land Register on Takeshima and Another Island in the Sea of Japan) to the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs, together with a rough sketch of Takeshima/Ullüngdo and Matsushima/Tokdo. In the

¹⁹ Nihonkainai takeshima hoka itto chiseki hensan kata ukagai (An Inquiry about the Compilation of the Land Register on Takeshima and Another Island in the Sea of Japan) in Kobunroku (Official Documents), Dajokan, ed. Section on the Home Ministry, 1877 (Tokyo: National Archives).
reply, Shimane prefecture treated the two islands together as it understood Matsushima/Tokdo was attached to Takeshima/Ullungdo.

The Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs examined on its own the record on the Takeshima/Ullungdo incident of the late 17th century as well as the reply from Shimane prefecture and concluded that the two islands were Korea’s, not Japan’s. However, “the acquisition or abandonment of a territory being a matter of great importance,” the Ministry, on March 17, 1877, referred the matter to the Dajokan for judgment. In the documents attached to the inquiry, “another island” was clearly stated as referring to Matsushima/Tokdo, and its shape and location were described correctly.

The Research Bureau of the Dajokan drafted the following: (See the photostatic copy of the script of this decision)

Re. the compilation of the cadastre for Takeshima and another island in the Sea of Japan as per Home Office inquiry.

Knowing that our country has nothing to do [with the islands] as the result of the communication between our old government and that country involved after the entry into the island by the Korean in the fifth year of the Genroku, and having examined the view stated in the inquiry, the following draft instruction has been made for deliberation and sanction.

Draft Instruction

Re. Takeshima and another island, it is to be understood that our country has nothing to do with them.

This draft was signed and approved by Minister of the Right Iwakura Tonomi, Vice Minister Okuma Shigenobu, Terajima Munenori, and Oki Takato. In other words, the Dajokan (the Council of State), the highest government organ in Japan at that time, formally declared, on the basis of the report of both Shimane prefecture and the Ministry of Home Affairs and treating Takeshi-
Dajokan decision: The script of the decision by the Japanese Dajokan (Council of State) dated March 20, 1877 states: “Takeshima/Ullungdo and Matsushima/Tokdo have nothing to do with our country.” The Japanese side has far withheld this document from the public.

ma/Ullungdo and Matsushima/Tokdo as an integral whole, that these two islands were not Japan’s territory. This instruction was sent from the Ministry of Home Affairs to Shimane prefecture on April 9 of the same year, and the question was settled at the prefecture, too.

It is presumed that the Foreign Ministry came to know about the islands through the report by Sada Hakubo et al. temporarily in the service of the Ministry who inspected the islands in 1870. In his report Chosenkoku kosai shimatsu naitansho (Report on the
Confidential Inquiry into the Particulars of the Relations with Korea), Sada writes:

I. Circumstances under which Takeshima and Matsushima have become Korea’s possessions.

Regarding this case, Matsushima is an island adjacent to Takeshima and there has been no document on them to date; concerning Takeshima, Korea sent people to settle there for a while after the Genroku era...20

This, too, views that Matsushima/Tokdo was given to Korea in the settlement of the “Takeshima Incident” in the Genroku period, but this is simply a report.21

The Japanese Foreign Ministry was prompted for its independent judgment on these two islands in connection with the development of the Matsushima question from 1876. In June of that year, a Muto Heigaku proposed to the Ministry the development of Matsushima. In the two following years, some civilians such as Kodama Sadayasu, Saito Sichirohei and Shimomura Rinsaburo, and Commercial Attache Wakise Hisato in Vladivostok submitted one after another similar proposals or applications.22

They pointed out the rich resources on the island and requested that they be permitted to develop Matsushima in the Sea of Japan (East Sea) which was either Japanese territory or whose ownership was unknown. They stirred up a sense of crisis, stating in common that Great Powers were trying to take over the island. Here Matsushima is Ullüngdo.

22. In a separate development, Toda Keiji submitted to the Governor of Tokyo in January 1877 “an application for voyage to Takeshima.” It was turned down in June of the same year. The action must have been taken swiftly because the matter came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Here again Takeshima is Ullüngdo.
On these applications the officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry had several different opinions among themselves. While admitting Takeshima/Ullüngdo to be Korea’s, Director Watanabe Kouki, Records Department of the Ministry, asserted that if there should exist another Matsushima separate from Takeshima/Ullüngdo it might be considered Japan’s territory. This view draws special attention in that it separated the ownership of Takeshima from that of Matsushima and is the precursor of the theoretical basis for the later incorporation of Takeshima/Tokdo into Japan’s territory. However, he knew about Usando as an ancillary to Ullüngdo and was at a loss as to how to handle Usando. He was not sure either whether there were two or three separate islands in the Sea of Japan (East Sea). More than anything else he did not know that Matsushima was in fact Ullüngdo in the applications for development.

Official “A” opposed development on the grounds that Matsushima belonged to Korea’s Ullüngdo and its development would amount to an act of aggression. Official “B” proposed to inspect Matsushima and Takeshima before they decided whether they were Ullüngdo, Usando or ownerless. Official “C,” without mentioning the ownership, but citing information on world powers’ movement, proposed to survey Matsushima, disregarding the Koreans living there.

Director Tanabe Taiichi of the Communication Department, the Foreign Ministry, knew from the very beginning that Matsushima, the target island for development in the applications, was Ullüngdo. Amidst pros and cons, Tanabe stated that if Matsushima was Usando its development would not be granted and that if the island were ownerless they had better negotiate with Korea.

In short, although there was Watanabe’s opinion to take in an island called Matsushima, it was the minority view. The majority

23. He believed Usando was Takesho.
view recognized Korea’s rights to Matsushima or conceded at least Korea’s involvement in the island, although they differed among themselves as to whether “Matsushima” should be regarded as Ullüngdo or Usando. As no decision was made, the Japanese Foreign Ministry proceeded to conduct an on-site survey of Matsushima, the target area for development in the applications.

The survey was made by the Japanese warship Amagi in July 1880, and it was confirmed that Matsushima was Ullüngdo.24 As it became unquestionably clear that Matsushima, whose rich natural resources had long attracted Japanese attention, was Korea’s territory, all the applications were turned down and the issue was put to an end. Takeshima/Tokdo was a completely barren island and could not be an object of any interest and concern. On November 29, 1881, the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs made an inquiry to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the situation in Ullüngdo, attaching thereto the afore-mentioned instruction of the Dajokan which excluded Takeshima and Matsushima from the Japanese territory.25 The Foreign Ministry raised no objection whatsoever to this. From then to 1905, the Japanese Foreign Ministry never treated the ownership of Takeshima/Ullüngdo and Matsushima/Tokdo.

As for the Navy, no original documents have survived, and we will have to rely on its publications to infer its knowledge of the land. Already in the 1860s, a British marine chart on which the Japanese Navy’s Hydrographic Department depended heavily, showed the two islands at their accurate locations. By the end of the 1870s the Japanese Navy seemed to have become fully convinced of that fact and marine charts made in Japan in the 1880s

25. See Naimu shokikan nishiyama sutezo no gaimushokikan ate shokai (Inquiry of Secretary Nishiyama Sutezo of Home Ministry to the Foreign Ministry Secretary) Gaimusho kiroku (Foreign Ministry Documents), 3824. Gaimushogaiko shiryakan (Foreign Ministry Archives of Historical Materials on Diplomacy).
likewise showed the accurate locations of the two islands. However, marine charts usually show geographical features and do not specify sovereign rights to islands in them. As for sovereign rights to islands, therefore, one has to consult a guide to sea routes, an expounder of a chart.

In March 1880, the Japanese Navy began to compile periodically and publish *Kan’ei suiroshi* (Sealanes of the World)\(^{26}\) covering the world. Of these publications, Volume 2, Edition 2 (Korea and Russia) was published in 1886, showing Ullüngdo and Liancourt Rocks. The publication, being a guide to world sealanes, is not decisive in determining the territorial ownership.

In March 1889, Japan ceased publication of the *Kan’ei suiroshi* and switched its emphasis to the Japan-centered northeast Asian seas. First, Japanese territorial waters were separated from others and *Nihon suiroshi* (Japanese Sealanes) was made independent and was published successively from 1892.\(^{27}\) This publication shows not only Taiwan and Hoko shoto (Pescadores) which Japan gained as its new territory under the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty in 1895, but also the northernmost island of Senshoto in the Chishima retto (Kuriles). But it does not include the other side of the Taiwan Strait and the Kamchatka Peninsula. In other words, the geographical coverage in the publication is limited to Japan’s territory and territorial waters.

What is important is the fact that Liancourt Rocks/Tokdo does not appear in the Sea of Japan (East Sea) in this publication. Given the fact that the Japanese sea maps at that time accurately show the position of the island, it is unthinkable that the Navy did not know its location. As shown in Chart 2, if we compare the map attached to the 1897 edition of the *suiroshi* (Sealanes) with that after the incorporation of Liancourt/Tokdo into Japanese possession, the

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picture becomes clear.

In other words, as of 1900 the Japanese Navy clearly excluded the island from Japan's territory. Moreover, the 1894 and 1897 editions of the Chosen suiroshi (Korea's Sealanes) by the Japanese Navy show Liancourt Rocks/Tokdo,²⁸ along with Ullüngdo. There is no doubt the Japanese naval hydrographic authorities were aware Takeshima/Tokdo belonged to Korea around the end of the 19th century. In brief, after the Meiji Restoration the Japanese government had not expressed any particular interest in Takeshima/Tokdo. It is clear that all the Japanese government organs involved regarded the island as Korea's, along with Ullüngdo though the degree of their cognizance of the island differed.

²⁸. The Japanese Navy conducted on-site surveys of Ullüngdo on several occasions, but all its information about Liancourt Rocks was acquired from the British Navy's publications on sea routes.
III. Japan’s Invasion of Korea’s Outlying Islands

A. Korea-Japan dispute over Ullungdo

Riding on the tide of external expansion following the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese started crossing the sea to Ullungdo on their own initiative. In 1881, a Korean inspector discovered that many Japanese trespassed on this island for logging and fishing. The Korean government promptly countered this by sending an official note to the Japanese government, demanding prohibition of such voyages. The Japanese Foreign Ministry apologized to the Korean side by acknowledging the wrongdoing, as it had confirmed Ullungdo to be Korean territory in the question of the development of Matsushima mentioned above.

However, the Japanese government did not take any concrete measures while the Japanese trespassing on Ullungdo continued ceaselessly. The Korean government repeatedly protested. As the Japanese government feared that this might develop into a diplomatic dispute, Japanese Ministries of Home Affairs and Justice each issued an unofficial notification banning voyages to Ullungdo.

In September 1883, the Japanese government directly sent a secretary of the Home Ministry and a ship to pull out the Japanese on Ullungdo and forcibly brought back all of the 254 Japanese engaged in logging. This was the first diplomatic negotiation the Japanese government conducted on Ullungdo.29 Those Japanese withdrawn from the island were all criminals of illegal departure from Japan and illegal trading, but they were all released after being judged not guilty. It is noteworthy that the Japanese Foreign Ministry at that time raised an objection to the acquittal of all of

them out of consideration for the Korean government on the matter.\textsuperscript{30}

This incident of numerous Japanese clandestinely intruding into the Korean territory made the Korea government change its policy on Ullıngdo: the vacant island policy enforced for several hundred years was abolished, and instead, an active development policy was implemented. Thus, in May 1882, Inspector Yi Kyu-wŏn was dispatched to Ullıngdo and on the basis of his report an ordinance was enacted for the development of Ullıngdo in December of the same year.\textsuperscript{31} This was followed by the appointment of the chief of island of Ullıngdo in the same year and the policy of settling the island started. Now Ullıngdo became a real Korean territory, not just a Korea territory on maps.

In 1883, Kim Ok-kyūn was appointed Commissioner for the Development of Southeast Islands and Whaling to push for an ambitious development of Ullıngdo, but this did not come to fruition because of his fall from power.

After that the administrative structure of Ullıngdo was reorganized several times, and in 1895, the island chief was upgraded to island supervisor; the Korean population increased gradually as the government offered tax exemption and encouraged migration to the island.\textsuperscript{32} In October 1900, Ullıngdo was elevated to the status of kun (county) whose magistrate was appointed from the central government. Ullıngdo was transformed into a stabilized Korean society from a completely undeveloped state.

\textsuperscript{30} Chosenkoku utsuruyoto e hankin toko no nihonjin hikimotoshi shobun (On the Disposition of Repatriation of the Illegal Japanese Voyagers to Ullıngdo of Korea) Gaimusho kiroku (Foreign Ministry Records 3824), Vol. 4.

\textsuperscript{31} According to his report, Ullıngdo kanch’al ilgi (Diary of Inspection Trip to Ullıngdo), the Japanese there thought the island was a Japanese possession, and they even built a pole stating “Matsushima of Great Japan.” Yi Kyu-wŏn is furious and cites the incident of An Yong-bok. Taehan Kongnonsa (Korean Public Information Service), ed., Tokdo (Seoul: 1965), pp. 126-48.

\textsuperscript{32} There were about 2,500 people at the end of the 19th century.
However, as the administrative structure was less well maintained than on the mainland, Ullüngdo was subject to Japanese aggression ahead of other regions. Even after the Japanese withdrawal in 1883, the people from various parts of Japan continued sailing to Ullüngdo without permission. Their purpose was originally to take out timber, but when worthy trees were exhausted by their logging, an increasingly greater number of Japanese fishermen came to the fishing grounds around Ullüngdo.

The Korean government requested repeatedly in 1888, 1895, 1898, and 1899 that the Japanese government evacuate the Japanese from Ullüngdo. This shows how persistent the Japanese trespassing was. According to an early investigation by the Japanese government, some 200 Japanese were staying at Ullüngdo about the year 1900, and the number rose to over 1,000 depending on the season.33

These Japanese settled down gradually on Ullüngdo. The Japanese government’s policy towards the Japanese settlers also changed. As stated above, in the early 1880s the Japanese government formally apologized to the Korean government and took measures to ban such voyages in one way or other. However, after the Sino-Japanese War, the government ignored the Korean demand for withdrawal and gradually came to confront the Korean demand.34

This corresponds with Japan’s overall intensification of aggression in Korea in the late 19th century. During the period, Japanese acquisition of railway and mining concessions and encroachment on monetary rights in Korea became more undisguised. The fishing situation under review in this article was no

33. *Utsuryoto ni okeru batsuboku kankei zikken* (Miscellaneou Cases Involving Felling on Ullüngdo). *Gaimusho kiroku* (Foreign Ministry Records) 3532. Reference is made to the various records of the Foreign Ministry.

34. In September 1899, the Japanese government ordered the withdrawal of the Japanese on Ullüngdo as part of its policy on Russia.
exception either.

The Japanese government in 1889 forced the Japan-Korea Fishing Regulations stipulating extraterritoriality and various unequal treatment. The Japanese fishing vessels invaded Korean coastal waters on a large scale and engaged in overfishing in a robber baron-like manner. A number of studies have shed light on frequent clashes that occurred between Korean fishermen with their livelihood threatened and the trespassing Japanese fishermen.35

Towards the end of the 19th century, the Japanese government did not only left this advance of Japanese fishermen to their own initiative, but pushed its fishery policy harder and further.36 A deep-sea fishing promotion law was implemented in 1898, and subsidized the development of pelagic fishing. At the same time, the highest official in the fishery administration, Director Maki Bokushin of the Agriculture-Commerce Ministry Fishery Department, inspected Korean coastal areas for one month beginning in June 1899. Then a Chosen Sea Fishing Cooperative was organized in every prefecture and a Federation of Chosen Sea Fishing Cooperatives in the capital city.

Further, in 1902, a Fishery Cooperative Law for Foreign Territorial Waters was enacted to develop the simple deep-sea fishing of the past into the settlement of the fishermen who had migrated. Under this government policy, each prefecture also carried out a policy of protecting fishing operations in the Korean coastal waters. In other words, the government and the people were united as one body to swarm into Korean fishing grounds from the end of


the 19th century. There was no consideration at all that Korea was a foreign country and there were Korean fishermen.

Ullúngdo was a case in point. What would happen when as many as 1,000 Japanese surged there during seasons as mentioned earlier? Kawakami says Japanese fishing at Ullúngdo was legitimate under the “Korea-Japan Fishing Regulations.” But, in reality, even this unequal agreement cannot justify Japanese activities at Ullúngdo because they did not pay the fishing tax stipulated in the regulations and were poachers. According to the regulations, if Japanese fishermen wanted to go to Ullúngdo for fishing, they had to pay the fishing tax first to the Korean government through the Japanese consulate in Pusan every year and receive licenses at the same time.

Also, according to the “trade regulations,” they were supposed to pay export duties for their catch. The Japanese fishermen at Ullúngdo did not follow this procedure and this clearly means that the Japanese consul in Pusan did not control them at all. As many Japanese data show, the Japanese fishermen came directly from their ports to the island and went back directly with their catch. Their fishing off Ullúngdo was unjust, even in view of this unequal agreement. This is true of their logging and “export” of the timber too. It is clear that all Japanese logging on Ullúngdo at the beginning was illegal. It seems that later some prices were to have been paid to local Koreans. Even so, since Ullúngdo was not an open port, export could not have been carried out there. Therefore, Japanese taking out lumber involved tax evasion and smuggling. The Japanese who lived on this island which was not a Japanese concession were, therefore, all illegal residents.

In short, the Japanese activities on Ullúngdo, whether fishing or lumbering, were all wrongful acts of aggression. It was not only a legal issue, but frequent clashes between the Japanese trespassers

and the local Koreans occurred.38

This became widely known as Ullungdo Chief Pae Kye-ju brought charges. According to his report, “the Japanese come to the island every year, strut around with swords and guns; threaten people; chase after women; rob their goods; and indulge in unlawful acts, causing much harassment to islanders.”39

Island Chief Pae went to Japan in July 1898, and demanded the police authorities of Shimane and Tottori prefecture control Japanese acts of violence, and he also brought charges of illegal tree felling and theft against several Japanese to the Matsue District Court. The Japanese prosecutor who investigated the case states: “at times there are said to be those who overpower them [Koreans] and if this trend continues, we cannot predict what would happen there.”340

Chief Pae also made a detailed report on the situation to the Korean government, and this became a diplomatic issue between the two governments.41 This was also frequently reported in the Korean newspaper of that time, Hwangsong sinbum (Capital Gazette). The Korean government demanded the Japanese withdrawal from Ullungdo anew, but the Japanese government took a position that no such dispute existed.

Then a joint on-the-spot investigation was conducted by inspector U Yong-jong of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Japanese Pusan Vice Consul Akazuka Masasuke; this did not settle

38. A report by Japanese government officials said relations between the peoples of the two countries were peaceful on Ullungdo, but it could not be trusted since they were instructed to return home with such a report. Hayashi Gonsuke, “Nikkan kanri-utsuryoto shutoho ni kansuru ken (On an Official Trip to Ullungdo by Japanese and Korean Officials),” Foreign Ministry Records, 3532.
the matter. So, the Korean government again requested the Japanese pullout from Ullŭngdo in accordance with the treaty between the two countries, whether or not a dispute existed.

The Japanese government acknowledged that the Japanese residents on Ullŭngdo were in violation of the treaty provisions but claimed that it did not have any obligation to evacuate them directly. Furthermore, the Japanese government argued that the Korean government should be held responsible for acquiescing in the Japanese residence in Ullŭngdo for more than 10 years and demanded that they accept this fait accompli and formally allow the Japanese to live there.

The two governments’ charges and counter-charges were repeated thereafter. In December 1901, Japanese Minister Hayashi proposed to station Japanese police under the pretext of a need to control the Japanese as trouble between the two peoples occurred frequently. Under the treaty, Japan had no right to station its police on Ullŭngdo, but he proposed to solve the local issue by posting the Japanese police there since the Korean government was not powerful enough to make the Japanese leave Ullŭngdo.

It was a thief's logic, but as the Korean government was at a loss to cope with the frequent troubles and did not positively oppose it, Japan implemented it forcibly. In March 1902, a police inspector and three policemen from the Pusan Japanese consulate were dispatched to the island and stationed there permanently. They professed to protect and control the Japanese nationals in conformity with the Japanese laws, but it is clear what role these Japanese police played at the scene of aggression.

From a fragmentary report by the Japanese police inspector one can infer that the Japanese police confronted County Chief Sim Hŭng-t’aeck who tried to block the Japanese smuggling of lumber

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42. “Utsuryō keisatsukan chūzaishō setchino ken (On the Establishment of a Police Station on Ullŭngdo),” Foreign Ministry Records, 3532.
and pushed their way to protect them.\textsuperscript{43} In 1904, Japan set up a post-office on Ullüngdo and opened a ferry service between the island and Hamada on the western coast of Japan.\textsuperscript{44}

Thus, immediately before the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese had built a firm position on Ullüngdo, with the support of the Japanese government. Under the protection of the Japanese police, many Japanese openly lived on Ullüngdo illegally, smuggled out lumber, and engaged in illegal fishing. In short, Ullüngdo's sovereignty was infringed by Japanese imperialists earlier than the mainland as it was Korea's frontier and was placed under Japanese domination.

\textbf{B. Japanese Fishing off Takeshima/Tokdo}

As in the 17th century, the Japanese passage to Ullüngdo was followed by their use of Takeshima/Tokdo, and that eventually became the basis for Japan's claim to territorial incorporation. Let us now look into Japan's "effective management" of the island.

From the end of the 19th century, Japanese fishermen from the San'in region sailed to Ullüngdo for fishing and made a brief stopover at Takeshima/Tokdo for some fishing.\textsuperscript{45} This fact can be confirmed by a recollection of the Japanese fisherman of the time.\textsuperscript{46}

Nakai Yozaburo of Saigocho of Okinoshima was one of those


\textsuperscript{44} Many of the Japanese on Ullüngdo were from Shimane prefecture, mostly from Oki Island. Also, the ratio between the Japanese residents and the Koreans was overwhelmingly in favor of the Japanese, the best in Korea, providing an excellent place for Japanese emigrants. Yoshida Keishi, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 469-70.

\textsuperscript{45} The divers with submersible gadgets went to Takeshima/Tokdo for fishing for two to three days on their way to Ullüngdo, while some went there for two to three days in the good weather while fishing off Ullüngdo. Okura Hukuichi, \textit{Takeshima oyobi utsuryoto} (Takeshima and Ullüngdo), (Matsue, Japan: Hokosha, 1907), p. 1r.

\textsuperscript{46} Kawakami, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 200-208.
fishermen. He took note of sea lions inhabiting Takeshima/Tokdo, when the prices of leather and oil rose immediately before the Russo-Japanese War. Not as part of catching fish and gathering shells, he started to hunt sea lions in earnest on Takeshima/Tokdo, beginning in 1903.47 Concerning Takeshima/Tokdo fishing at the beginning of the 20th century, the Chosen suiroshi (Korean Sealanes) published by the Japanese Navy’s Hydrographic Department states as follows:

Takeshima [the Liancourt Rocks]: Koreans call this island Tokdo and Japanese fishermen, Liancoto. When the warship Tsushima surveyed this island, November in the 37th year of Meiji (1904), there were small thatched huts for fishermen on the East Islet, but they were said to have been destroyed by wind and waves. Every summer, dozens of people come from Ullungdo to catch sea lions. They build huts on this island and stay there for about 10 days each time.

Ullungdo, also called Matsushima [Dagelet Island]: Main activity is abalone gathering and a large quantity of dried abalones are exported. The sea animal called todo (sea lions) inhabit Takeshima southeast of this island and beginning in the 37th year of Meiji (1904) the people of this island began catching them. Sea lion catching is conducted for six months from April to September; at present three groups of fishing vessels are engaged in it (with each group catching about five head). Besides sea lions the Japanese are said to gather daily an average 1,130 kin (680kg) of abalone by using two sets of diving apparatus and two steam boats.48

There was an argument between the governments of Korea and Japan as to whether “those people who came from Ullungdo”

were Japanese or Koreans. Let’s look at the data on which this is based as it is difficult to judge by this statement. The basic source of the above description is the reports by two Japanese warships, the *Niitaka* and the *Tsushima*. The former is more important. The logbook of the *Niitakta* in its entry on September 25, 1904, clearly states that the information was obtained from a man who actually saw [Liancourt] from Ullŏngdo and records as follows:

Koreans call the Liancourt Rocks Tokdo, while Japanese fishermen call it Lianco. It is possible to moor vessels between the two rocks, but a small boat is usually pulled ashore. When the sea is rough and it is difficult to anchor, boats usually take refuge in Ullŏngdo until the weather calms down. Those who come from Ullŏngdo to catch sea lions use a Japanese vessel that can load 60 to 70 koku (307 to 358 U.S. bushels), and build huts to stay there for about 10 days each time; the catch is said to be plentiful; and the number of the crew sometimes exceeds 40 to 50, but they talk about the lack of fresh water. 49

Another historical source is an article by Geographer Tanaka Akamaro based on various Navy reports and the report by the governor of Shimane prefecture on his inspection trip to Takeshima in August 1905 as follows:

On the East Islet, there are thatched-roof huts which belong to the Takeshima Fishing Company of Nakai Yozaburo and others. (Both the huts and vessel were washed away by a storm on August 8, 1905). These huts are for fishermen who come here in summers to catch sea lions but they are badly damaged and only traces remain now. The fishermen are based in Ullŏngdo and use wooden boats capable of loading 60 to 70 koku, and when fishing is over or when the boats cannot be berthed because of heavy seas, they take refuge at Ullŏngdo as soon as the weather calms down. 50

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Tanaka’s article also contains the descriptions after Japan’s incorporation of Takeshima/Tokdo. It is clear from these data that the sea lions hunting on Takeshima/Tokdo that began in 1903 was conducted mainly by Japanese. But, Koreans were not totally uninvolved with this hunting. The Korean Sealanes in its section on Ullüngdo clearly distinguishes the Japanese from the Koreans but those who went to Takeshima/Tokdo for fishing are simply called the inhabitant of this island. Kawakami also acknowledges the fact that Koreans had taken part in Takeshima’s sea lion hunting, although limiting them to those hired by Japanese. There is no room for any doubt that it was mainly the Japanese fishermen who hunted the sea lions although some Koreans were involved.

What is noteworthy is that the Japanese fishermen such as Nakai Yozaburo were described as “inhabitants” of Ullüngdo. They lived in Ullüngdo and went out to Takeshima/Tokdo from their base in Ullüngdo and promptly returned when a storm was gathering. In other words, those Japanese fishermen’s activities on and off Takeshima/Tokdo would be viewed historically in the vein of the Japanese invasion of Ullüngdo.

If that is the case, what kind of relationship did the Koreans on Ullüngdo have with Takeshima/Tokdo? It was already stated that despite Kawakami’s persistent denials, Takeshima/Tokdo can be seen from Ullüngdo and that Koreans knew the island well. It is also clear through the warship Niitaka’s report that Koreans used the name of Tokdo before Japan incorporated it.

In order to deny the possibility that Koreans on Ullüngdo utilized Takeshima/Tokdo before Japan’s incorporation of the island, Kawakami asserts that Koreans did not know about fishing. Mainly

52. That “it is written as Tokdo” in the above mentioned data shows that the county chief who belonged to the intellectual class was cognizant of Takeshima/Tokdo. But, in some books, the name of Usando is still used. Ibid.
on the basis of the *Kankoku suisanshi* (Korea’s Marine Products), Kawakami says that Koreans on Ullŭngdo started fishing after the Japanese taught them how to catch cuttlefish in 1907. He also observes that only Japanese gathered abalones, and no Koreans ever did it.

So, he concludes that it was not possible for Koreans to go to Takeshima/Tokdo for fishing even if they knew about the existence of the island. But, Kawakami’s assertion is disowned by the data he himself uses. For example, the Navy’s *Kan’ei suiroshi* (The Sealanes of the World) writes about Ullŭngdo as follows in Vol. 2 Chapter 2:

As for products, the island abounds in abalone and various kinds of fish in large quantity, and vegetables are found there too. In spring and summer, Koreans come to this island, build Korean-style boats and send them to the mainland and gather a large amount of crustaceans.

Also, Secretary Takao Kenzo of the Japanese Foreign Ministry who was sent to Ullŭngdo in September 1899, reports the island’s native population at present is about 2,000 in some 500 dwellings, of them half are farmers and another half fishermen, and there are some carpenters making boats.

There are also records and documents between the mid-19th century and the early 20th century in Europe and Japan, which describe the fishing activities, particularly abalone gathering by the Korean fishermen in Ullŭngdo. Ignoring all these would be too arbitrary.

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Kawakami also refers to the crudeness of Korean navigational techniques of that time, but many Koreans were going between Ullüngdo and the mainland every year, which is far more distant than between Ullüngdo and Takeshima/Tokdo. It is quite natural for Korean fishermen who depended on abalone gathering for a living to go to an island rich in fish and located at a visible distance. Just as the Japanese fishermen recollected their fishing on and off Takeshima/Tokdo as mentioned already, an elderly Korean also gives his firsthand experience of going to Takeshima/Tokdo for fishing.  

The Korean fishing on and off Ullüngdo rapidly dwindled because of the invasion of many Japanese fishermen. The description in the *Records on Korea’s Marine Products* that “abalone gathering is entrusted to the Japanese and no native islanders are engaged in it” merely means that Korean fishermen formerly engaged in abalone gathering were pushed out of the fishing grounds by the new mode of Japanese fishing with such technology as diving apparatus.

Accordingly, while even the indigenous fishing grounds off Ullüngdo were robbed by the Japanese, the fishing rights on that distant islet could not become any problem. It was more than natu-

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57. Hong Chaehyŏn (born 1862) who moved to this island in 1883, recalled that “at the time of the development, the people on Ullüngdo discovered Tokdo immediately, and went to Tokdo many times to gather seaweeds and abalones and catch sea lions. I myself went there several dozens of times.” Tokdo, op. cit., p. 30; also see, Yi Kyu-gyŏng (1764-1856), *Oju yŏn mun changjŏn san’go* (Random Expatiations of Oju), (Seoul: 1957), Vol. 1, p. 655. He says that Koreans from Kangwŏndo, Ullüngdo caught sea lions there.


59. Concerning the fishery dispute between Korea and Japan at Ullüngdo, see Pak Ku-byŏng, “Sipkusaeginal hanilgan ûi ôdp e chŏggyong doen yonghae samhaeri wŏnch’ik e kwan hayŏ” (Concerning the Principle of Three-mile Territorial Waters Applied to Fisheries between Korea and Japan at the End of the 19th Century), *Hanil yŏn’gu* (Korea-Japan Study), Vol. 1, 1972.
ral that the Japanese should lead the sea lion hunting on Takeshima/Tokdo from 1903.

If the concept of effective management is applied for form’s sake, the Japanese side is clearly in an advanced position vis-a-vis Takeshima/Tokdo on the eve of the 1905 territorial incorporation. However, when viewed from the historical point of view, imperialism conducts “management” beyond its borders. The Japanese management of Takeshima/Tokdo in the early 20th century took place as a part of the Japanese advance to Ullüngdo against the background of the government’s aggressive policy.\textsuperscript{60}

The incorporation of Takeshima/Tokdo could have been justified only when the island had completely been a \textit{terra nullius} and when the Korean government and people in the face of Japan’s imperialist aggression had not raised an objection to the Japanese action of incorporation. The absence of the first condition has already been pointed out in the preceding chapter and the latter will be discussed in the following chapter.

It was in 1903 that Nakai started hunting sea lions on Takeshima/Tokdo, but as many competitors appeared the following year, the number of sea lions declined sharply. So, he thought of monopolizing the fishing ground by excluding competitors and went to Tokyo for maneuvering.

\textsuperscript{60} The relations between Ullüngdo and Takeshima/Tokdo were gradually strengthened and in the 1930s, 40 fishermen (including 2 to 3 Japanese) went fishing off Takeshima/Tokdo. Japan Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Bureau, ed., \textit{Takeshima gyogyo no henseng} (Changes in Fishery off Takeshima) (Tokyo: 1953), pp. 17, 36, 37.
IV. Japan’s Territorial Incorporation of Takeshima

A. Japanese Government’s Military Demand

As the Russo-Japanese War broke out, the Japanese government found a new value in Takeshima/Tokdo from the strategic standpoint of war execution, quite apart from Nakai Yozaburo’s personal plan.

The Japanese government had already decided at a cabinet meeting before the start of the war that “Korea should be placed under Japan’s influence by force under whatever circumstances,” and again made the Korean government acknowledge in the Korea-Japan protocol that Japan would temporarily expropriate the places needed for military purposes. In reality, Japan went on tightening its military control over all of Korea without any treaties. In this section, the Navy’s military facilities will be taken up for discussion. Before the war, Japan was working on the military telegraphic communication lines and watchtowers, and decided to expand those facilities to Korea when the war started.

In June 1904, tension suddenly heightened in the Korean Strait as Russia’s Vladivostok fleet showed up there and sank Japanese transports one after another. The Japanese Navy built the watchtowers on the coastal areas of Kyushu and Chugoku, in parallel with those of Chukpyŏn Bay, Ulsan, Kōmūndo, and Chejudo in southeastern Korea and linked them with submarine cables.

The watchtowers numbered 20 in Korea, and they were nothing other than military occupation. On July 5, 1904, watchtowers


62. Ibid.

were built on Ullungdo and it was decided to link them with the Japanese Navy anchorage in Chukpyŏn Bay on the Korean mainland by military submarine cables. Ullungdo's two watchtowers were one at the southeastern part (East Tower with six men posted) and the other at the northwestern part (West Tower with six men posted). Their construction started on August 3, 1904, and the operation began on September 2 of the same year. The submarine cable was installed under the threat of the Vladivostok fleet and completed on September 25 of the same year. Through this cable, the watchtowers on Ullungdo were able to communicate directly with the Japanese naval base in Sasebo through the Korean mainland. The stationing of a Japanese military force on Ullungdo meant the further violation of Korean sovereignty over the island where the Japanese had already built its superior position.

In a series of construction work on Ullungdo as well as supply

64. Ibid. pp. 48-57.
activities, and also in the course of patrol activities in these waters, a lot of information was gained about Takeshima/Tokdo.\textsuperscript{65} Namely, the Navy already paid attention to the island’s value well before Nakai Yozaburo submitted a request to the government, and had already started taking action even before the Japanese government officially decided to incorporate the island.

On November 13, 1904, the Japanese Naval General Staff ordered the warship \textit{Tsushima} to inspect the Liancourt Island/Tokdo and see whether it was suitable for the installation of a telegraphic station (not radio station) there.\textsuperscript{66} It was a survey to examine whether it was possible to build a watchtower there to be linked by submarine cable with Ullungdo. The \textit{Tsushima} arrived at the Liancourt Island on November 20, and this was the first-ever survey of Takeshima/Tokdo by the Japanese government. The \textit{Tsushima}’s captain reported that although there was some topographical difficulty, it was possible to build a structure on the East Islet.\textsuperscript{67}

The Japanese government’s interest in Takeshima/Tokdo at that time was only for its military value. As it was absolutely impossible to engage in construction work on Takeshima/Tokdo during the winter, Japan, without starting the work, faced the decisive battle with Russia’s Baltic fleet. As the seas around Ullungdo and Takeshima/Tokdo became the main sea battleground, the island’s military value came to be highly valued.\textsuperscript{68}

The Japanese Navy drafted a plan on May 30 immediately following the sea battle, and on June 13, 1905, instructed the warship \textit{Hashitade} to go to the island for a further detailed survey.\textsuperscript{69} The

\textsuperscript{65} The report by the warship \textit{Niitaka} was made at the time of the work to install the cable on Ullungdo.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Gunkan isushima senji nisshi} (The Logbook of Warship \textit{Tsushima} During the War), (kept in the Self-Defense Agency War History Department).

\textsuperscript{67} Japan Naval General Staff, \textit{op. cit.}, reference documents, pp. 366-367.

\textsuperscript{68} The name of Takeshima became widely known in Japan due to the newspaper reports about this naval battle.

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Gunkan hashitade senji nisshi} (The Logbook of the Warship \textit{Hashitade} during the
Navy thus set up a plan for comprehensive facilities in the Sea of Japan (East Sea) including Ullăngdo and Takeshima/Tokdo on June 24 of the same year. The plan called for (1) the construction of a large watchtower on the northern part of Ullăngdo (nine men to be posted) and a wireless telegraphic station, (2) the construction of the long-pending watchtower on Takeshima/Tokdo (to be manned by four men), (3) the watchtowers of the two islands to be linked by submarine cables which are to be extended to the watchtower on Oki Island. These were illegal military facilities without regard to national boundaries.

The construction of the new watchtower on Ullăngdo started on July 14, 1905, and was completed on August 16, while that on Takeshima/Tokdo began on July 25 and completed on August 19. The original plan to link Takeshima/Tokdo with Oki Island by submarine cables were changed when the peace treaty with Russia was concluded in September 1905, and instead the line was set up between Takeshima/Tokdo and Matsue. This work was started at the end of October 1905, and a link from Ullăngdo to Matsue via Takeshima/Tokdo was completed on November 9 of the same year. Consequently in 1905, a network of military communication lines were completed from the Korean mainland (Chukpyŏn) to Ullăngdo, Takeshima/Tokdo, and Matsue.

In short, for the Japanese government, Takeshima/Tokdo was nothing more than an object of military value, and it was closely related to and inseparable from military occupation of various parts of Korea at that time.

B. Opinions of Japanese Government Bureaucrats

In the early autumn of 1904, Nakai Yozaburo went to Tokyo to influence the Japanese government and obtain exclusive fishing

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70. Japan Naval General Staff, op. cit., pp. 20-21, 93-95.
rights to Takeshima/Tokdo. At that time, how Nakai regarded the territorial ownership of Takeshima/Tokdo was extremely important as he was in a position to know the local situation best.

The *Shimanekenshi* (Records of Shimane prefecture) published in 1922 by Shimane prefecture Education Board states in the Takeshima/Tokdo section: “There is a fear of many ill effects as many regions compete in overfishing in 1904. Believing this island to be Korean territory, and planning to apply to the government for lease of the island (dotted lines by the author), Nakai went to the capital to explain the situation at the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce.” In the Korea-Japan dispute, the Japanese government ignored this description in the historical data simply as the editor’s misunderstanding.\(^7\) Is it real?

There are two sources in which Nakai himself remarked about the territorial incorporation of Takeshima/Tokdo. First is the *Takeshima oyobi utsuryoto* (Takeshima and Ullungdo) by Okuhara Hukuichi who narrates what he heard “personally from Nakai” on March 25, 1906 as follows:

Nakai believed that the Liancourt island was Korean territory and decided to file a request with the Korean government for its lease. As soon as the fishing season ended in 1904, he went to the capital and met Fishery Bureau Director Maki at the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce through an official of the Ministry named Fujita Kantaro from Oki. The Director supported his idea and took steps to ascertain the status of Liancourt Island from the Navy’s Hydrographic Department. Nakai immediately went to see Director Kimotsuki of Hydrographic Department and heard from him that there was no definite evidence of the ownership of Liancourt, which is 10 nautical miles nearer to the Japanese mainland than the Korean mainland, and that so long as there is a Japanese who is engaged in management of the island, it is natural to incorporate it into Japanese territory. ......

\(^7\) Japan Foreign Ministry, *Kaigai chosa geppo* (Overseas Research Monthly), Nov. 1954, p. 68.
Finally, Nakai made up his mind and submitted the request for territorial incorporation of Liancourt Island and its lease to the three Ministers of Home Ministry, Foreign Ministry and Agriculture-Commerce. Nakai presented himself to the Home Ministry Local Affairs Department and explained the situation to Secretary Inoue. He also went to the Foreign Ministry through a member of the House of Peers with the introduction of Doctor of Laws Kuwada from his native town and met Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza and discussed this problem with him. With Dr. Kuwada's active help, Nakai inquired at Shimane prefecture about its opinion. Then Shimane prefecture, after confirming the view of Oki Island, submitted a report to the higher authority and as a result, the incorporation of the island was decided at a cabinet meeting, with Liancourt Island named Takeshima.\footnote{Okuhara Hukuichi, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 27-32. Also Okuhara Hekiu (Hukuichi), "Takeshima enkaku ko (A Study of History of Takeshima)," \textit{Rekishi chiri} (A Study of History & Geography), Vol. 8, No. 6, 1906.}

From this data it is clear that: first, Nakai believed that Takeshima/Tokdo was clearly Korean territory and tried to apply to the Korean government for its lease; second, it was definitely the Japanese government which changed his request into that for incorporation of an ownerless land.

The second source is the personal history Nakai submitted to Oki Island. Nakai attaches a summary of his Takeshima management as follows:

As I thought that the island was Korean territory attached to Ullângdo, I went to the capital trying to submit a request to the Residency-General. But, as suggested by Fishery Bureau Director Maki Bokushin, I came to question Korea's ownership of Takeshima. And at the end of my investigation with the matter, I convinced myself that this island was absolutely ownerless through the conclusion by the then Hydrographic Director Admiral Kimotsuki. Accordingly, I submitted an application through the Home Ministry to the three
Ministers of Home Ministry, Foreign Ministry and Agriculture-Commerce Ministry for incorporation of this island into Japanese territory and for its lease to me.

The Home Ministry authorities had an opinion that the gains would be extremely small while the situation would become grave if the acquisition of a barren islet suspected of being Korean territory at this point of time [during the Russo-Japanese War] would amplify the suspicions of various foreign countries that Japan has an ambition to annex Korea. Thus, my petition was rejected.

Undaunted, I rushed to the Foreign Ministry to discuss the matter in detail with the then Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza Enjiro. He said the incorporation was urgent particularly under the present situation, and it is absolutely necessary and advisable to construct watchtowers and install wireless or submarine cable and keep watch on the hostile warships. Particularly in terms of diplomacy, he told me not to worry about the Home Ministry view. He asked me in high spirits to urge the Home Ministry to refer his application speedily to the Foreign Ministry; in this way Takeshima came under our country’s dominion.\(^{73}\)

As this data was recorded several years after the incorporation, the Korean government was referred to as the “Residency-General” by mistake. But, it was written by Nakai himself and, therefore, describes in detail the Japanese government’s posture to cope with the situation. The important points follow:

Firstly, the Home Ministry bureaucrats clearly opposed the incorporation of Takeshima/Tokdo. As stated above, the Home Ministry confirmed in 1877 that Takeshima/Tokdo was Korean territory the same as Ullıngdo, and these records and this information were handed down to its bureaucrats. Therefore, they hesitated to

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\(^{73}\) Shimane ken koho bunshoka (Public Information & Document Div., Shimane prefecture), ed., Takeshima Kankei Shiryö (Materials on Takeshima), 1953, Vol. I. From the end of Nakai’s personal history, it is inferred to have been made in 1910.
conclude that Takeshima/Tokdo was an ownerless island even when Japan started its aggression in Korea.

Secondly, it was the three men, Maki Bokushin, Kimotsuki Kenko and Yamaza Enjiro who forcefully carried out the incorporation over the opposition of the Home Ministry bureaucrats. The personal backgrounds of these three men are very interesting. Maki Bokushin, as mentioned before, had been the Fishery Bureau Director of the Agriculture-Commerce Ministry, the highest fishery administrator, for a long time and took the lead in developing Japan’s stagnant fishing into a deep-sea industry. However, that policy meant intrusion into the Korean coastal waters and expansion of its zone of operation.

Kimotsuki Kenko was a specialist bureaucrat who had spent his whole career in the Hydrographic Department and laid the firm foundation for Japan’s waterway administration. In peacetime the department engaged in collecting and keeping ordinary hydrographic information and in time of war became a strategic organ providing necessary information for direct military operations. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, Kimotsuki devoted himself to the military operations in the coastal waters of Korea and Manchuria, in the capacity of Hydrographic Department Director.

Director Yamaza Enjiro of the Foreign Ministry Political Affairs Bureau was known to have been under the influence of the nationalist, rightist organization of the Genyosha and have pushed, together with Minister Komura Jutaro, for the Ministry’s hardline external policy as well as the policy of advance into the Continent. Before becoming the director, he was assigned to the consulate and the legation in Korea and planned and worked busily to acquire various interests for Japan. In the incorporation these bureaucrats

74. “Hachinen no tsutometa suisan kyokuchô Maki Bokushin (Fishery Bureau Director Maki Bokushin Who Served for Eight Years),” Suisenkai (Fisheries World), Nos. 975, 1966.
forced, it is quite natural that Korea's sovereignty and claims were not taken into consideration.

Thirdly, the grounds for incorporation were clearly made known. Kimotsuki's claim that Takeshima/Tokdo was owned by no one at all in 1904 was totally different from the past position taken by the Navy's Hydrographic Department, as stated already. In spite of this, he suggested the application of the theory of "occupation of a terra nullius" on the basis of the simple fact that Nakai started fishing on this island in the previous year. But, this was only the superficial theory, and what motivated the Japanese government was the military need for the facilities to cope with the Russian naval fleet, as Yamaza said.

In the final analysis, the incorporation of Takeshima/Tokdo was similar to the military actions Japan took in many other parts of Korea at that time for the execution of the war, by infringing upon Korea's sovereignty. Only, it took advantage of an individual fisherman who sought to monopolize the fishing ground and did not end at its occupation but took the form of its incorporation. If Japan's military occupation of the Korean Peninsula was the prerequisite for the "annexation of Korea," the incorporation could be said to have been a step forward. Under the instruction of the three men mentioned above, Nakai submitted to the three Ministries of Home Ministry, Foreign Ministry and Agriculture-Commerce a "Request for Territorial Incorporation of Liancourt Island and Its Lease" on September 29, 1904, and the Japanese government decided at a cabinet meeting on January 28, 1905 on the incorporation of the island in the form of granting the application.

C. Japan's Public Notice and Korea's Response

On February 22, 1905, Shimane prefecture announced Public

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Notice No. 40, naming Liaojie Island Takeshima and placing it under the Chief of Oki Island. The Japanese government did not announce this decision in the official gazette, nor make a public announcement on the central government level. One can cite as a precedent of the Japanese government establishing territorial sovereignty over an island related to foreign countries, the case of the Ogasawara Islands in 1876. At that time, the Japanese government made the decision after negotiating with Britain and the United States which were deeply related with the islands, to win their understanding. Japan also notified 12 European countries and the U.S.A. of its action.\textsuperscript{77}

As for the acquisition of Takeshima/Tokdo which some Japanese thought might belong to Korea, the Japanese government did not make inquiry of the Korean government, much less notify it of the action of incorporation afterwards. Korea learned of the Japan’s incorporation in March 1906, one year after the measure was taken. A Shimane prefecture delegation led by an administrative official, Zinzai Yutaro, dropped by Ullungdo after making an inspection tour of Takeshima/Tokdo. On March 28, Zinzai Yutaro and his party visited Ullungdo County Chief Sim Hŭng-t’ack and notified him of the Japanese incorporation of Takeshima/Tokdo. Surprised at the unexpected news, Shim reported immediately to the central government the next day as follows:

Tokdo belonging to this county is located in the sea 100 ri from this county. A Japanese steamship moored at Todongp’o in Udo on the 4th day of the month about 8:00 a.m and a group of Japanese officials came to my office and said, “we came to inspect Tokdo since it is now Japanese territory.” The group included official Zinzai, of Oki Island in Shimane prefecture, Director Yoshida Meigo of the Tax Supervision Bureau, police sub-station chief, Inspector Kageyama Iwahachiro, one policeman, one local assemblyman, a doctor and a

technician and about a dozen followers. They have come for the purpose of finding out firstly, the number of households, population, and land production, and secondly, the number of personnel and expenditure. The record having being made, we submit this report for your reference.\(^{78}\)

Lunar March 5, 10th year of Kwangmu (1906)

The visit to Ullüngdo by the Zinzai party was well known, but this data has not been examined in Japan at all. In the dispute with Korea, the Japanese government even doubted the existence of this document itself. As its basis, a Japanese scholar writes that “one sea lion caught on Takeshima was presented to the County Chief, who thanked them for the gift. Such a treatment would not have happened if the County Chief had considered Takeshima as belonging to Ullüngdo.”\(^{79}\)

But, that is to ignore the difficult situation Ullüngdo was faced with at that time. As stated before, Japanese soldiers and police were permanently stationed on Ullüngdo and more than 300 Japanese lived in and around Todong where the county office was located. The fact that Zinzai and his party investigated at will the number of households, population and geographical features in the foreign territory of Ullüngdo graphically illustrates the one-sided power relations of that time.

If County Chief Sim did not openly raise objection to Zinzai and his party on the territorial problem, it was due to the pressure from the Japanese. His courteous treatment of the Japanese did not mean that he approved Zinzai remarks. This also does not justify the Japanese denial of this data itself.

Kawakami elaborates on the Zinzai visit to County Chief Sim,

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78. Yang T’ae-jin, Han’guk kuggyong yong’t’o kwang’yë munhônjip (References on Korean Territory and Boundaries) (Seoul: n.p., 1979), p. 11. March 5 in the lunar calendar corresponds to March 29 in the solar calendar.

but does not refer to the county chief’s report at all. As this data is widely used by Korean scholars in their research and contains extremely important contents, Kawakami’s silence on this point can only be taken as a deliberate cover-up of the historical data.

County Chief Sim clearly states in his report that Takeshima /Tokdo belongs to Ull∧ngdo. He reported on the unexpected movements of the Japanese officials who claimed the island as Japanese territory and asked the central government for instruction.

Here, the island once called Usando is called Tokdo. There are many theories about the origin of the name of Tokdo, but Koreans already called and wrote the name of the island as Tokdo(獨島) before Japan’s incorporation of the island as can be seen above.

Sim’s report was delivered to the magistrate of Kangwŏn Province and Acting Magistrate Yi Myŏng-nae in turn reported it to the State Council (Ŭijŏngbu) Minister Pak Chae-sŏn. Minister Pak is said to have stated that the claim that Tokdo had become Japan’s possession was groundless, and he instructed the officials to investigate in detail the Tokdo situation and report on what Japanese were doing there.

The administrative documents recording these facts are said to be still extant in Korea, but the full text has not been made public.\(^8^0\) However, one can easily find the great repercussions triggered by Sim’s report in the newspapers of that time.

Korea’s representative newspaper of that time, the Hwangsoň sinmun (Capital Gazette) reported an article entitled “Local Ull∧ngdo Report to the Home Ministry” on May 9, 1906 about the Zinzai Incident by quoting the Ull∧ngdo County Chief’s report to the Home Ministry.\(^8^1\) The content of the newspaper report is almost


the same as the report from County Chief Sim, and appears to have originated from the Home Ministry. Therefore, there is no question about the existence of County Chief Sim’s report.

Another national newspaper which existed at that time, Taehan Maeil Sinbo (Korea Daily News), a nationally circulated newspaper, also reported this incident. It carried the following story on May 1, 1906:

Unusually strange things are happening. Ullungdo County Chief Sim Hŭng-t'aeck reported to the Home Ministry that a party of Japanese government officials came to Ullungdo and professed that Tokdo belonging to Ullungdo was now Japanese territory, and took record of the topography, population and land size, etc. The Home Ministry sent a directive saying that it is strange for them to record the population of other country while on an excursion, and as their claim to Tokdo as Japanese territory is totally groundless, the story is really shocking.\(^\text{82}\)

The first half of the article merely summarized County Chief Sim’s report, but the second half is valuable in finding out the reactions of the central government. Namely, Korea’s central government was recognizing from the beginning that Tokdo was Korean territory. Therefore, it harbors a suspicion of the movement of the Japanese officials who made incomprehensible remarks.

It is certain that many Korean people learned through this newspaper coverage of the Japanese move to incorporate Takeshima/Tokdo into its territory and must have read it as an aggression into Korean territory. For example, Hwang Hyŏn who lived in Kurye, Chŏllado, at that time writes in a note that “the Japanese are making a false statement that Tokdo belongs to Japan while it is our own territory.”\(^\text{83}\)

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In other words, Korea’s central government, local Ullungdo County Chief and civilians all considered Japanese incorporation of Takeshima/Tokdo as aggression at that time. But, by that time, Japan had virtually started colonial rule over Korea, by establishing the Residency-General in Korea. That is why no further development could be made within the Korean government to cope with the problem of Takeshima/Tokdo. As the entire country was being robbed of its sovereignty and vanishing, the problem of the ownership of a small rocky island was hurled away. However, that the Korean people clearly raised objection to the Japanese action of incorporating Takeshima/Tokdo is a decisively important fact worthy of historical evaluation.

Conclusion

In 1905, the Japanese government incorporated Takeshima/Tokdo into its territory through administrative measures. To justify the measures there are two views: the majority opinion represented by Kawakami argues the island had continuously been Japanese territory since early modern times, and the measure of 1905 was nothing but its reconfirmation; and the minority opinion holds that the island had been completely a terra nullius in 1905 and was subject to prior occupation.

As to the former, this article has clarified that it is false, in view of the formal decision made by the Dajokan in 1877 that Takeshima/Tokdo was outside of the Japanese controlled territory. As for the latter, it is refuted by half of the facts cited in this article. In other words, Korea had been conscious of Takeshima/Tokdo as its territory since the 15th century and expressed its opposition immediately upon learning of the Japan’s measure of 1905. The dispute started at the time of the Japanese incorporation, not in 1952.
Both the majority and minority opinions have one similar point that Japan's incorporation of Takeshima/Tokdo in 1905 was totally unrelated to Japan's aggression of Korea. However, the fishing at Takeshima/Tokdo which became the grounds for its incorporation cannot be separated from the Japanese advance into Ullungdo. Above all, the Koreans of the day considered the Japan's incorporation of the island similar to the infringement of its sovereignty and aggression taking place in other various parts of Korea.

A territorial problem should be examined individually and thoroughly from a historical viewpoint. In the case of Tokdo/Takeshima, the word "historical" should include the direct process leading to the incorporation of the island and also what kind of relationship Japan had with Korea in 1905.