Regarding Dokdo - Takeshima
This page is intended to first summarize Japan's view on the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Second, by using original documents from United State's Department of State, Foreign Affairs Office, the reader will hopefully come away with a broader understanding of the decisions Allied Command made. This page will also show how and why the allies determined which territories were returned to post WWII Japan.
"...The negotiations involving the fate of former Japanese territories was a long, drawn-out process. The first five and seventh drafts of the treaty provided that Liancourt be given to Korea by including the islets in the Article 2(a) list. The sixth, eighth, ninth, and fourteenth drafts explicitly stated that the territory of Japan included Dokdo Takeshima. The tenth through thirteenth and fifteenth through eighteenth drafts, like the final draft, were silent on the status of Dokdo Takeshima..."
America Supports Korea's Claim to Liancourt Rocks
"...Article 3The Allied and Associated Powers agree that there shall be transferred in full sovereignty to the Republic of Korea all rights and titles to the Korean Mainland territory and all offshore Korean islands, including Quelpart(Saishu To), the Nan how group (San To, or Komun Do) which forms Port Hamilton(Tonaikai), Dagelet Island(Utsuryo To, or Matsu Shima), Liancourt Rocks(Takeshima), and all other islands and islets to which Japan had acquired title lying outside ¡¦ and to the east of the meridian 124¡Æ15¡ÇE. longitude, north of the parallel 33¡ÆN. latitude, and west of a line from the seaward terminus of the boundary approximately three nautical miles from the mouth of the Tumen River to a point in 37¡Æ30¡ÇN. latitude, 132¡Æ40¡ÇE. longitude...."
"...This line is indicated on the map attached to the present Agreement..."
"...Japan hereby renounces in favor of the Korean people all rights and titles to Korea (Chosen) and all offshore Korean islands, including Quelpart (Saishu To); the Nan How group (San To, or Komun Do) which forms Port Hamilton (Tonakai); Dagelet Island (Utsuryo To, or MatsuShima); Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima); and all other islands and islets to which Japan had acquired title lying outside the line described in Article 1 and to the east of the meridian 124¢ª15¢«E. longitude, north of the parallel 33¢«N. latitude, and west of a line from the seaward terminus of the boundary at the mouth of the Tumen River to a point in 37¢ª30¢«N. latitude, 132¢ª40¢«E. longitude. This line is indicated on Map No. 1 attached to the present Treaty..."
Military Policy on the Japan Peace Treaty
Here it was recorded:
"...General MacArthur's basic strategic concept is for the U.S. to retain naval and air bases in Japan after a treaty for the primary purpose of making it unmistakably clear to the USSR that aggression against Japan will mean all-out war with the United States..."
"...General MacArthur believes that arrangements for U.S. bases in Japan after the treaty should be arrived at by negotiation with Japan on an equal basis with the Japanese, and should be incorporated into a separate U.S. Japan agreement which would come into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the treaty. The latter document would leave the U.S. and Japan free to conclude such an agreement. The base areas defined in the agreement, would be located at points of maximum strategic advantage and would be secured by the requisite number of U.S. forces..."
November 14, 1949
As Shimane Prefecture's Brochure points out, on November 14th 1949, Political Advisor in Japan William Sebald stated, "...Japan's claim to this island is old and appears valid..." However, Shimane's Brochure left out the next line. It states "...Security considerations might conceivably envisage weather and radar stations thereon..." Notice first Sebald states "reconsider" meaning they had already decided Dokdo Takeshima was Korean territory. It's not clear how the U.S. came to the conclusion Dokdo Takeshima belonged to Japan as Korea was not given a chance to raise a contrary claim at this point but we know military considerations were a high priority.
In the sixth draft of the Japan Peace Treaty we can see Takeshima was included as part of Japan. This draft reads as follows:
"...CHAPTER II
TERRITORIAL CLAUSES
Article 3
1. the territory of Japan shall comprise the four principal Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaide and all adjacent minor islands, including the islands of the Inland Sea(Seto Naikai) ; Tsushima, Takeshima(Liancourt Rocks), Oki Retto, Sado, Okujiri, Rebun, Riishiri and all other islands in the Japan Sea(Nippon Kai) within a line connecting the farther shores of Tsushima, Takeshima and Rebun...cont..."
As shown above, the U.S. desired to install a military weather and radar station on Dokdo Takeshima. This could be accomplished through joint security trusteeships between Japan and the U.S. if incorporated into the Japan Peace Agreement. Eventually the Americans would acquire sign joint trustee agreements on some of the outlying islands through the the San Francisco Peace Treaty such as Marcus Island. As a result still, the U.S. still has bases on some of these islands today (ie Okinawa).
In an August 9, 1951 letter to the Korean Ambassador, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote the following:
"As regards the island of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks, this normally uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never treated as part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. The island does not appear ever before to have been claimed by Korea...."
Dean Rusk was involved in military affairs throughout his life and political career. In World War II he joined the infantry as a reserve captain (he had been a ROTC Cadet Lieutenant Colonel), he served in Burma as a staff officer and ended the war as a colonel with the Legion of Merit and Oak Leaf Cluster. He returned to America to work briefly for the War Department in Washington He was made Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in 1950 and played an influential part in the US decision to become involved in the Korean War.
As Secretary of State, Dean Rusk was consistently hawkish, a believer in the use of military action to combat Communism.
In this exchange it can be read Dean Rusk supported Japan's claim to Dokdo Takeshima. However, as we continue to study more American records from the Japan Peace Treaty archives we will see these papers do little more than show U.S. decisions on territorial ownership were based largely on military strategy.
"Koreans on Liancourt Rocks"
"...The history of these rocks has been reviewed more than once by the Department, and does not need extensive recounting here. The rocks, which are fertile seal breeding grounds, were at one time part of the Kingdom of Korea.They were, of course, annexed together with the remaining territory of Korea when Japan extended its Empire over the former Korean State..."
"...The rocks standing as they do in the open waters of the Japan Sea between Korea and Japan have a certain utility to the United Nations aircraft returning from bombing runs in North Korean territory. They provide a radar point which will permit the dumping of unexpended bomb loads in an identifiable area. Therefore in the selection of maneuvering areas by the Joint Committee implementing Japan America security arrangements, it was agreed these rocks would be designated a facility by the Japanese Government and would serve the purposes mentioned above...".
In this case it seems the needs of the Americans and Allied Command took precedent over the belief Liancourt was Chosun land. It also shows why Liancourt Rocks were designated as a facility of the Japanese government earlier. We can see although some considered Dokdo Takeshima Korean territory the needs of the U.S. Military came first.
Allied Decisions Regarding Korea's Chejudo
Within American Foreign Affairs Department documents can be found the statement:
"...In view of the uncertain future if Korea, it was suggested for consideration that it might be advisable to leave Quelpart Island (Chejudo) under Japanese sovereignty in spite of the fact that the population is Korean..."
The British also considered this idea, as this documents reveals. It reads:
"...Sir Dening remarked that the island of Quelpart (Chejudo) which Japan was to renounce as being part of Korea, might become a military liability. Quelpart was very near Japan might turn communist. After some discussion Colonel Babcock said he thought that if the whole of Korea became a communist state the strategic position would have changed so much more for the worse that the question of whether or not Quelpart (Chejudo) was part of Korea would not make much difference from the military point of view. It was agreed, however, that this would be considered further..."
Thus, we know from these records true historical title was not the grounds for allied decisions in the disposition of land.
This became apparent in a Top Secret Foreign Affairs document from January 1951 intended for Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The confidential letter was issued after Dean Rusk, and Allison had a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It stated:
"...The United Kingdom is seeking to gain the initiative and is itself drafting a peace treaty... We are not familiar with the precise terms of any British proposals, but we do not know that the British policy in relation to the Far East is different in many essential aspects from our own and it can be assumed that the British Commonwealth proposals will not adequately take account of what the United States believes to be its vital interests in this area..." (link)
As we see, the views of other countries regarding Dokdo Takeshima diverged from U.S. Foreign Policy. For example, the United Kingdom's requested a linear boundary in the East Sea (Sea of Japan) that would have placed Dokdo Takeshima within Korean territory. The Americans objected saying the Japanese "felt psychologically boxed in" by this proposal.
"Japanese sovereignty shall continue over all the islands and adjacent islets and rocks lying within an area bounded by a line from a latitude of 30N in a north-westerly direction to approximately latitude 33N 128 E then northward between the islands of Quelpart, Fukue-Shima, bearing north-easterly between Korea and the island of Tsushima, continuing in this direction with the island of Oki-Retto to the south-east and Takeshima to the north-west..."
As we have read, the British wanted to establish a boundary line around Japan to clearly define her territory. This proposal seemed quite practical and would have avoided many areas of dispute that were best solved outside of the Japan Peace Treaty. However, the U.S. stated the Japanese felt "boxed in" by this idea.
"...In view of the need to ensure that none of the islands near Japan is left in disputed territory, the New Zealand Government favours the precise delimitation by latitude and longitude of the territory to be retained by Japan as suggested by Article 1. of the United Kingdom's draft..."
See map and docs below
The Canadians stated:
"...The Canadian Government is of the opinion that the Japanese Peace Treaty should, insofar as possible, follow the spirit of wartime agreements concerning the disposition of former Japanese territories...In the interest of reaching an agreement on the treaty itself, the Canadian Government is of the opinion that Japan should be called on to renounce all her rights, titles and interests in her former territories leaving their disposition to be decided upon outside a treaty..."
In other words, Canada did not support Japan's claim to Dokdo Takeshima within the framework of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Thus, at this time, Canada felt Japan should be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku as stated in the 1943 Cairo Convention and the 1945 Potsdam Declaration...
Office Memorandum July 13, 1951
"...Liancourt Rocks"(Dokdo) could be included in the peace treaty, and that it might be "advisable to name the territories specifically in the draft treaty, in some such form as the following (Article 2): (a) Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton, Dagelet, and Liancourt Rocks".
Boggs' reply is special. Being a State Department Geographer his rationale behind defining Japan's territory represents a practical approach to the dispute not tainted by military ambitions but rather on the geopolitical reality of the region. His memorandum foreshadows the potential for conflict the Dokdo Takeshima dispute had even decades ago. S.W. Boggs' solution remains a logical answer to the problem even today. He knew declaring the border of Japan~Korea between Ulleungdo and Dokdo would have been a huge mistake.
The Syngman Rhee Line (Peace Line) is Established
What becomes immediately apparent is Syngman Rhee's "Peace Line" is almost identical to the numerous Allied maps that already proposed a boundary between Japan and Korea. They too had logically concluded the limit of Japan's waters should be slightly East of Dokdo Takeshima.
During the Japan Peace Treaty negotiations Syngman Rhee expressed his frustration that the ROK wasn¡®t permitted to directly participate in discussions that would ultimately define South Korea's national boundaries. Korea was not allowed to sign the Japan Peace Treaty. On January 26, 1951 the Koreans conveyed their dissatisfaction with being frozen out of the talks while Japan and the U.S. had conducted bilateral negotiations.
Here it could be read:
¡°...President Rhee considers that Korea is entitled to participate as a matter of right, and should not have to plead for its proper place in the negotiations..." (see doc)
When the South Koreans came to the realization they were not being fairly represented, President Rhee took matters into his own hands. He simply solidified the Japan Korea boundary already implemented by the previous directives from Allied Command such as SCAPIN 677 (map) and previous Post WWII Agreements such as the Cairo Convention.
We must remember, although the United States (Dean Rusk) "...didn't feel that the Treaty should not adopt the theory that the Potsdam Declaration constituted a final renunciation of Takeshima...", Other nations such as Canada and the USSR felt these WWII agreements should be taken literally or as guidelines for the Japan Peace Treaty to follow. The final determination of these islands was for the Allies to decide, not just Dean Rusk or General MacAthur. In the end, South Korea, like the USSR and India opted not to accept the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The ROK should not be vilified because she refused to allow foreign powers to determine her national boundaries.
April 28, 1952
The San Francisco Peace Treaty's Article 2 related to Territory reads as follows:
CHAPTER II
TERRITORY
"..Article 2
(a) Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.
(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.
(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.
(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of 2 April 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.
(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.
(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands..."
Why Japan's MOFA and Shimane Prefecture are Wrong.
First, the most obvious error by the Japanese is The San Francisco Peace Treaty simply makes no mention of Dokdo Takeshima. The Allies simply couldn't arrive at an agreement and dropped the matter. This shows other countries couldn't agree with U.S. policy on this problem. Other nations (U.K. N.Z. Canada) that participated in the talks had a different approach to establishing Japan's limits. They wanted to follow the spirit of post wartime documents such as the Cairo Convention and the Potsdam Declaration and leave the contentious issue of outlying islands to be resolved outside of the treaty altogether. Commonwealth nations proposed a linear boundary between the Okinoshimas and Dokdo Takeshima. This was much more practical approach but it didn't work for America's military plan in northeast Asia.
The Rusk Papers and other U.S. correspondence Japan uses only represent the confidential views of the American government. While it is true Dean Rusk supported Japan's claim to Dokdo Takeshima the Rusk papers were secret memorandums that never materialized into American public support for Dokdo Takeshima. In fact the Japanese themselves were not aware of Dean Rusk's opinion. Striclty speaking, the Americans never openly supported the Japanese claim and since the early 1950s have remained neutral on this issue.
Sadly to say, the Koreans were not allowed to directly participate in these talks even though the Koreans voiced their objections. In hindsight it's quite outrageous Korea was not permitted to become involved in the negotiating process that would define the territorial boundaries of her own country. As a result, Korea was not allowed to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Therefore, at least it shows this treaty has no legal effect on the Republic of Korea. Similarly when the USSR declined to sign the treaty, the U.S. Government conceded the San Francisco Peace Treaty had no binding legal effect on the Russians.
Initially the Japan Peace Treaty with regard to territory, was intended to follow the policy set forth by the Cairo Convention and Potsdam Declaration. This would have put Dokdo outside of Japanese territory. General MacArthur's November 2, 1949 policy revealed a departure in this plan. From early on, American decisions on territorial ownership ceased to be based on true title and were tainted by American needs to posture for the Cold War with USSR. A clear example of this policy change can be seen related to Cheju Island which was for centuries known to be Korean land. We know allied command did not make decisions based on true historical title.
The Japanese government wishes to demonize former President Rhee's for his harshly imposed "Peace Line" but when we compare this limit from other borders agreed upon by Allied Command, the Rhee's Peace Line in almost identical. Obviously the ROK became frustrated watching the Allies divide up the region and decided to take matters into her own hands. Simply put, after centuries of Japanese invasions into Korea's coastal waters and islands the ROK initiated, and enforced a border defence policy based on the only principle the Japanese would respect. Brute force.
