Shimane Prefecture’s Takeshima Propaganda Brochure

However, Japan claims an EEZ over 154,500 square miles (400,000 km²) around Okinotorishima. The PRC disputes this claim, saying the area only consists of rocks and not islands.

Japan’s past policy of constructing artificial islands and declaring rocks as EEZs tells us in the event she was to acquire Takeshima, the next step could very well be (as some Japanese officials have hinted) to declare or make Takeshima “habitable” or as an EEZ. This could further complicate the issue. Korea, on the other hand, has maintained uninhabitable islands cannot be designated as EEZs and allows for a 12 nautical mile zone around Dokdo. This is similar to an equidistant boundary between Korea and Japan’s nearest landfalls.

Most importantly, most, if not all, historical maps of Japan fail to include both Ulleungdo (Takeshima) and Dokdo (Matsushima) as Japanese territory. Some of these historical maps can be found at the following links.

Governor Nobuyoshi Sumita, not surprisingly, makes no mention that the Japanese Navy surveyed the islets for building military watchtowers months before the incorporation. There is no mention the Russo~Japanese War was raging in China, besieged Port Arthur (Dalian) had just fallen and Admiral Togo’s Fleet waited to engage Russia’s approaching Baltic Fleet in the Tsushima Straits. These events all occurred as Japan quietly annexed Takeshima. The announcement little more than a whisper at regional government levels.

On February 8th 1904 the Japanese Navy opened a surprise attack on Russian boats Varyag and Korietz anchored in Chemulpo (Incheon). Their troops continued to advance into Seoul and after weeks of continued intimidation and manipulation, the Koreans signed the February 24th, Japan-Korea Protocol.

The protocol allowed the Japanese to occupy strategic areas of Korea. Immediately the Japanese Army and Navy began constructing military observation and communications posts on all strategic coastal and island locations of Korea. These areas included: Uldo Island, Cheju Island, Udo, Hongdo, Palpo, Wonsan, Jukpyeon, Ulsan, Jinae, Geomun Island, Baekryoeng Island, Ulleung Island, Pohang, and Pusan.

The Japanese Warship Tsushima was issued special directive #276 on November 13th 1904. It included three instructions: a)Inform of the test of the wireless telegraph communications of Takasaki Mountain (on Oki Island) along with the test technician. b)Survey Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo Island) for its suitability for telegraph installation (not wireless telegraph) c)Dispatch workers and materials for Matsushima, (Ulleungdo) Jukpyeon, and Cape Ulsan watchtowers.

These instructions alone demonstrate Japan’s military activities during the Russo~Japanese war are inseparable part of the annexation of Dokdo Island.

Furthermore, the Korean government contested Japan’s annexation of Dokdo at different governmental levels and through local media immediately upon being informed in 1906. However, by this time, the Japanese had assumed control over Korea’s foreign affairs office.

We can also determine if Japan thought Takeshima (Ulleungdo) and Matsushima were part of Japan by citing maps of the 17th Century. Japanese maps of this era consistently show the Okinoshimas as the northwest boundary of Japan. A typical map from this time can be found on the right, above this text.

There are some discrepancies in the historical records of this incident to be sure. However rather than take an academic approach, Japanese scholars chose to disregard this valuable data. It’s not surprising there are some facts that don’t add up, the records of the dispute are hundreds of years old and recorded by two different nations. Some points need to be addressed because Japan’s Takeshima brochure falls short of being objective.

The Shimane Brochure seems to concede the islands in this dispute were indeed Takeshima (Ulleungdo) and Matsushima (Dokdo). Page five of the newly discovered Murakawas records read as follows:

According to Anyoengbok: “Takeshima (Ulleungdo) is this Bamboo Island. He says that there is an island named Ulleungdo in Dongnae-bu, Gangwando, Korea and this is also called Bamboo Island. He had a map of eight provinces of Korea that says so. Matsushima (Dokdo) is the island called Jasan (Usan) in the same province of Gangwando. It is the same name for Matsushima (Dokdo) and this is also recorded on the eight provinces of Korea map..”

Chosun maps are often used to as proof that Usando is Jukdo Islet because it is located close to Ulleungdo’s shore on these charts. Citing these maps is problematic because they all seem to show five large non -existent inlands on the southeast shore of Ulleungdo. There are no such islands located is this position. It’s very curious that all of these maps show these non existent islands. The only conclusion is these maps were copied through the ages and the “phantom islands” added on.

The Ulleungdo Island region endured a period of neglect after Chosun initiated a vacant island policy on Ulleungdo. This was due to repeated invasions by Japanese pirates and the devastating effects of the Imjin Wars. After the Anyongbok incident occurred in the late 17th Century, there was renewed interest in Ulleungdo and new surveys were undertaken. Thus the term “The So-Called Usando” began to be seen on late 17th Century maps but it’s not clear if these maps are the Usando of ancient times.

“…In the end there was no mention of Liancourt Rocks in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The allied powers did not indicate why they chose to remain silent on the outcome, but the varying positions taken during the deliberation process indicate that the decision was made either because not enough information had bee provided regarding the historical events surrounding Japan’s incorporation of Dokdo Takeshima or because the Allied Powers felt themselves incapable or inadequate adjudicators…”

When the Cold War started, America and her allies were in the process of militarily posturing against Russia and China. Staunch anti-communist politicians such as Dean Rusk were involved in the negotiations over Takeshima. It is Dean Rusk’s confidential memorandums that Japan cites in their argument over Takeshima. Who was Dean Rusk?

Dean Rusk returned to America to work briefly for the War Department in Washington. He was made Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in 1950 and played an influential part in the US decision to become involved in the Korean War.

As Secretary of State, Dean Rusk was consistently hawkish, a believer in the use of military action to combat Communism. During the Cuban missile crisis he initially supported an immediate military strike, but he soon turned towards diplomatic efforts. His public defense of US actions in the Vietnam War made him a frequent target of anti-war protests.

In this exchange it can be read Dean Rusk supported Japan’s claim to Dokdo Takeshima. However, as we continue to study more American records from the Japan Peace Treaty archives we will see these papers do little more than show U.S. decisions on territorial ownership were based largely on military strategy.

It should also be noted, The Rusk Papers were confidential memorandums. None of Rusk’s opinions were made public nor conveyed to the Japanese government. In fact, they weren’t made public until decades later. Thus, the Rusk papers never materialized in official U.S. support for Japan’s claim to Dokdo. Rusk’s views were just one phase of America’s policy toward Dokdo that would later change into a neutral stance on the issue.

The following image is a summarized meeting record between allied commanders during the negotiation process of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Although this portion isn’t related to Takeshima it shows how the allies deliberated before reaching their decisions. This conversation describes the situation on Cheju Island (Quelpart) This island, located south of the Korean peninsula, was indisputably Korean land. However, as this documents shows, the allies considered giving the Cheju Island to Japan for fears the Korean peninsula would fall to communist forces creating a military disadvantage.

As this document shows, military strategy of Allied Forces was a top priority when they drew territorial limits of Korea and Japan during the San Francisco Peace Treaty negotiations process.

The next paper shows some American politicians at the time considered Korea’s historical claim as valid. Writing on behalf of Ambassador to Japan, Robert Murphy, the First Secretary of the American Embassy in Tokyo, John M. Steeves, writes Despatch No. 659 entitled “Koreans on Liancourt Rocks, concerning the September 15 bombing incident, when the U.S. accidentally bombed some Koreans fishing on Liancourt Rocks.

However, it this case it seems the needs of the Americans and Allied Command took precedent over Korean assertions Liancourt was Chosun land. It also shows why Liancourt Rocks were designated as a facility of the Japanese government earlier. The second half of Steeves report reads:

“…The rocks standing as they do in the open waters of the Japan Sea between Korea and Japan have a certain utility to the United Nations aircraft returning from bombing runs in North Korean territory. They provide a radar point which will permit the dumping of unexpended bomb loads in an identifiable area. Therefore in the selection of maneuvering areas by the Joint Committee implementing Japan America security arrangements, it was agreed these rocks would be designated a facility by the Japanese Government and would serve the purposes mentioned above…”

In direct contradiction to Japan’s argument, the rational interpretation of all the post-war instruments would lead to the conclusion that, unless any express decision provides otherwise, SCAPIN No.677 would take precedence. The Peace Treaty’s mere omission of mentioning Tokdo as part of Korea’s territory does not amount to the cession of Tokdo to Japan. And a fair interpretation would be that the islands mentioned in Article 2 of the Peace Treaty should be illustrative rather than enumerative given the large number of islands scattered around the Korean Peninsula. Even if its absence of any reference causes various interpretations over the status of Tokdo, this would by no means alter the illegality of Japan’s 1905 incorporation measure.

These days, it seems the Japanese have shifted their position to attacking Korean historical claims and desperately clinging to their dubious 1905 Shimane Prefecture Inclusion. But does the 1905 annexation of Dokdo make sense in this era? The geography of the region hasn’t changed of course but what about Korea’s political and economic situation in the 21st Century? What relevance does Japan’s 1905 annexation have in today’s modern, peaceful northeast Asia?